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Abstract
We study the relationship between the cognitive load manipulation and strategic so-
phistication. The cognitive load manipulation is designed to reduce the subjects cognitive
resources which are available for deliberation on a choice. In our experiment, subjects
are placed under a large cognitive load (given a di¢ cult number to remember) or a low
cognitive load (given a number which is not di¢ cult to remember). Subsequently, the
subjects play a one-shot game then they are asked to recall the number. This procedure
is repeated for various games, where a new number is given for each game. We nd
a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship between cognitive load and strategic sophisti-
cation. This relationship is consistent with two e¤ects. First, subjects under a high
cognitive load tend to exhibit behavior consistent with the reduced ability to compute the
optimal decision. Second, the cognitive load tends to a¤ect the subjects perception of
their relative standing in the distribution of cognitive ability. The net result of these two
e¤ects depends on the strategic setting. Our experiment provides indirect evidence on
the literature which examines the relationship between measures of cognitive ability and
strategic sophistication.
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1 Introduction
Models of strategic sophistication have greatly improved our understanding of play in games.1
These models posit that subjects exhibit heterogenous sophistication in their thinking of the
game. An open question relates to the origin of these strategic levels and whether they arise
from a fundamental trait of the subjects. A natural candidate for the source of the strategic
levels is the measured cognitive ability of the subject. This has prompted researchers to
investigate the relationship between measured cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.2
However, one di¢ culty in employing measures of cognitive ability is that subjects with
di¤erent measures of cognitive ability are possibly also di¤erent in other ways. As such, it
might not be possible to distinguish between an alternate hypothesis that an unobserved
characteristic is responsible for the level of strategic sophistication, and cognitive ability is
merely correlated with this characteristic. Here, rather than measure cognitive ability, we
manipulate the cognitive resources available to the subject via cognitive load. Cognitive
load experiments often direct subjects to make a decision in one domain while simultaneously
manipulating the cognitive resources available to reect on the decision.
The cognitive load manipulation is designed to occupy a portion of the working memory
capacity of the subject. Working memory can be conceptualized as the cognitive resources
available to temporarily store information so that it can be used in decision making. Therefore,
working memory is instrumental in the execution of deliberative thought.3 Several studies
have found that measures of cognitive ability are positively related to measures of working
memory capacity.4 Further, reducing the available working memory of a subject via cognitive
load, reduces the cognitive resources available for deliberation, and can be regarded as similar
to the condition of having a lower cognitive ability. Additionally, given the within-subject
1For instance, Stahl and Wilson (1994,1995), Nagel (1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001),
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004). See Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri
(2013) for an updated overview of the eld.
2See Bayer and Renou (2012), Burnham et al. (2009), Brañas-Garza, Paz Espinosa, and Rey-Biel (2011),
Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013), Devetag and Warglien (2003), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2010), and
Gill and Prowse (2012).
3See Alloway and Alloway (2013).
4For instance, see Conway, Kane, and Engle (2003), Kane, Hambrick, and Conway (2005), Oberauer et
al. (2005), and Süßet al. (2002). See Burgess et al. (2011) and Cole et al. (2012) for recent advances in
understanding the neurological basis of this relationship.
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design of our experiment, we are able to observe the behavior of each of the subjects in
di¤erent cognitive load treatments. As a consequence, our results are not possibly driven by
unobserved characteristics which are only related to cognitive ability.5
Although we expected that the successful cognitive load manipulation would produce uni-
formly less strategically sophisticated behavior, we nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relation-
ship between cognitive load and strategic sophistication. In fact, our results are consistent
with recent advances in the literature. While much of the research on the source of strategic
sophistication focuses on measures of cognitive ability, recent research emphasizes the role of
the perception of the strategic sophistication of the opponent. For instance, Agranov et al.
(2012) nd that the strategic sophistication of the subject is related to the perceived strategic
sophistication of their opponents.6
In our experiment, we direct subjects to play various one-shot games while under a cogni-
tive load manipulation. In particular, we direct subjects to play ten 3 3 games, a variation
of the 11  20 game (Arad and Rubenstein, 2012), and a variation of the beauty contest game
(Nagel, 1995). We note that our version of the 11  20 game is relatively simple, the beauty
contest is relatively complicated, and the 3 3 games have various levels of complexity.
The subjects play these games under either a low or a high cognitive load. Subjects in the
low load are directed to commit a three digit binary number to memory and subjects under a
high load are directed to commit a nine digit binary number to memory. Subsequently, the
subjects are asked to recall the number.
Through a single manipulation of the available cognitive resources, we observe behavior
consistent with two e¤ects. First, subjects under a high cognitive load have di¢ culty making
the computations associated with optimal play. In this regard, high load subjects can be
considered to be less sophisticated than low load subjects. Second, subjects under a high
load are aware that they were relatively disadvantaged in the cognitive ability distribution of
the subjects. Therefore, high load subjects can be considered to be more sophisticated than
low load subjects. We nd that the net result of these two e¤ects depends on the strategic
5Although we note that the research nds that the cognitive load manipulation is more e¤ective on subjects
with a higher measure of cognitive ability (Carpenter et al., 2013).
6Also see Alaoui and Penta (2012), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), and Slonim (2005).
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setting.
The e¤ect of the constrained ability to make calculations dominates the other e¤ect when,
in the relatively complicated beauty contest game, the high load subjects select less strategic
actions. This is consistent with the diminished ability of the high load subjects to compute
the optimal strategy in the complicated game. Additionally, we see this e¤ect dominating
in that high load subjects have greater di¢ culty in predicting the actions of their opponents
and they are more likely to behave as the relatively unsophisticated L1 type. Finally, we see
this in that the subjects in the 3  3 games are less sensitive to the complexity of the game,
as measured by the number of their own dominated strategies.
On the other hand, the e¤ect of the reduction in their perceived standing in the cognitive
ability distribution dominates the other e¤ect in our version of the 11   20 game, which is
relatively uncomplicated. Here, high load subjects select a more strategic response, consistent
with the expectation that they are paired with a more cognitively able subject. We also see
this e¤ect in that high load subjects are more likely to express beliefs which are consistent
with their opponents playing their Nash Equilibrium strategy. Finally, we see this in that the
subjects in the 3 3 games are more sensitive to the complexity of the game, as measured by
the number of the dominated strategies of their opponent.
In summary, we nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship between available cognitive
resources and strategic sophistication. We hope that our results are helpful in the e¤orts to
improve the models of strategic sophistication.
1.1 Related literature
The economics literature increasingly regards the brain as an object worthy of study in that,
subject to its limitations and heterogeneity across subjects, it is the generator of economic
behavior. This line of inquiry has investigated topics ranging from the e¤ects of sleep on
strategic behavior (Dickinson and McElroy, 2010, 2012), to optimal search patterns (Sanjurjo,
2012a, 2012b), to neurological studies of the brain during choice (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009),
to novel elicitation methods designed to measure the reasoning of subjects (Agranov, Caplin,
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and Tergiman, 2013; Burchardi and Penczynski, 2011; Chen et al., 2010; Crawford, 2008). In
particular, there is a growing literature which investigates the relationship between measured
cognitive ability and economic preferences7 and the relationship between measured cognitive
ability and behavior in games.8 To the extent that subjects under a high cognitive load are
similar to the condition of having a low cognitive ability, our results provide indirect evidence
on the relationship between cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.
There is an extensive literature on the cognitive load manipulation in nonstrategic settings.
The research nds that subjects under a high cognitive load are more impulsive and less
analytical (Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2003), they are more risk averse and are more
impatient (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2012), they make more mistakes on a forecasting
task (Rydval, 2011), they exhibit less self control (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward and Mann,
2000, Mann and Ward, 2007), they fail to process available information (Gilbert, Pelham, and
Krull, 1988; Swann et al., 1990), they perform worse on gambling tasks (Hinson, Jameson,
and Whitney, 2002), they make di¤erent choices in allocation decisions (Cornelissen, Dewitte,
and Warlop, 2011; Hauge et al., 2009, Schulz et al., 2012), and they have di¤erent evaluations
of the fairness of outcomes (van den Bos et al., 2006). This literature nds that the behavior
under a cognitive load is consistent with the condition that the subjects have fewer cognitive
resources available for deliberative thought.
On the other hand, there does not exist many instances of studies of the strategic behavior
which employ the cognitive load manipulation. To our knowledge, Roch et al. (2000),
Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011), Du¤y and Smith (2013), and Carpenter, Graham, and
Wolf (2013) are the only such examples. We note that the rst three of these papers are
not designed to investigate models of strategic sophistication. For instance, Du¤y and Smith
(2013) direct subjects to play a nitely repeated multi-player prisoners dilemma game while
7See Arruñada, Casari, and Pancotto (2012), Benjamin et al. (2012), Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman
(2004), Brañas-Garza, Guillen, and Lopez del Paso (2008), Branstätter and Güth (2002), Burks et al. (2009),
Chen et al. (2013), Cokely and Kelley (2009), Dohmen et al. (2010), Frederick (2005), Millet and Dewitte
(2007), and Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009).
8See Ballinger et al. (2011), Baghestanian and Frey (2012), Bayer and Renou (2012), Brañas-Garza, Garcia-
Muñoz, and Hernan Gonzalez (2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2011), Carpenter et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2010),
Gill and Prowse (2012), Jones (2011), Jones (2008), Palacios-Huerta (2003), Putterman, Tyran, and Kamei
(2011), Rydval (2011), Rydval and Ortmann (2004), and Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011).
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under a di¤erential cognitive load. The authors nd that the low load subjects exhibit more
defection near the end of play and they are better able to condition their strategy on previous
outcomes. However, their study does not immediately lend itself to the study of strategic
sophistication, as the games are repeated and the subjects receive feedback about the strategic
outcomes.
In contrast to these three studies, Carpenter et al. (2013) induce a di¤erential cognitive
load in subjects then observe the strategic sophistication of the subjects. The subjects
play a sequential game which can be solved by backwards induction. The subjects also
provide both actions and beliefs in the beauty contest game. The authors nd that subjects
under a high cognitive load are less strategic in that they are less able to perform backwards
induction. Additionally, the authors nd that high load subjects believe that their beauty
contest opponents select a higher number and the authors observe a larger deviation from the
best response to these beliefs. Our most comparable result is that we nd that high load
subjects are less strategic in that they select a higher number in the beauty contest. While
our beauty contest results coincide with those of Carpenter et al., we also note that we nd
instances where the high load subjects can be considered to be more strategic.
We also note that there are methodological di¤erences between Carpenter et al. and our
paper. First, Carpenter et al. employs a between-subjects design, whereby subjects are
exclusively observed in a single cognitive load treatment. This design introduces possible
di¤erences in payments across treatments, since correctly performing the memorization task
pays an additional amount. By contrast, we employ a within-subjects design, whereby each
subject plays some games under a high load and other games under a low load. Therefore,
the di¤erences which we observe are not possibly driven by di¤erences in the payments across
the cognitive load treatments.
In our view, this paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we provide
additional evidence that the cognitive load manipulation a¤ects strategic behavior. Second,
we nd that the relationship between strategic sophistication and available cognitive resources
is nuanced and nonmonotonic. In fact, this nuanced relationship is achieved through only
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a single cognitive load manipulation. We view our results as providing indirect evidence
which could inform the research on the relationship between measures of cognitive ability and
strategic sophistication. In particular, our results suggest that a lower measure of cognitive
ability will not necessarily produce less sophisticated behavior, particularly when the ability
to make the necessary computations is not a binding constraint.
2 Method
A total of 164 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were drawn from the
experimental economics subject pool at Rutgers University-New Brunswick and the sessions
were conducted in the Wachtler Experimental Economics Laboratory. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).9 There were 5
sessions of 20 subjects and 4 sessions of 16 subjects. Sessions lasted from 60 to 75 minutes.
2.1 Specication of the games
We direct subjects to play a series of games: ten 3  3 games, an adaptation of the 11   20
game, and an adaptation of the beauty contest game. These games are used because they
provide di¤erent estimates of the strategic sophistication of the subjects. The subjects are
not given feedback about the outcomes of the games. The subjects are told that they would
be randomly and anonymously rematched in each of the games.
First, we direct subjects to play 10 simultaneous action 3  3 games. These games are
simplied versions of games used by Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008), Rey-Biel (2008),
and Bayer and Renou (2012).10 In these games, each subject is matched with another subject
and both make a selection among three possible actions. In addition to selecting an action,
we also elicit the point beliefs of the subjects about the action of the other player. Each of
the 3  3 games has an original version (labeled A) and a transposed version of the original
game (labeled B). In other words, the A and B versions are strategically equivalent but the
roles have been switched. From the perspective of the games as specied in the appendix,
9The z-Tree code is available from the corresponding author upon request.
10See the appendix for the precise specication of the games used and a screen shot.
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subjects play all 10 games as either a row or a column player. Therefore, each subject plays
both roles in each of the 5 strategically equivalent games. We note that the game is always
presented so that the subject is the row player and the opponent is the column player. As a
result, every player selects among actions labeled Top, Middle, and Bottom, and selects beliefs
about the action of the opponent which are labeled Left, Center, and Right. Throughout the
experiment, 10 points are equivalent to $3:50. Correct beliefs are rewarded with 4 points.
See the appendix for a screenshot of the choice in the 3 3 games.
We also use a variant of the 11   20 game (Arad and Rubenstein, 2012). Subjects are
randomly matched with another subject and select an integer between 1 and 10. The subjects
receive the amount selected, where again 10 points were equivalent to $3:50. However, the
subject receives a bonus of 10 points if they select a number exactly one digit lower than their
opponent. Hereafter, we will refer to this game as the 1   10 game.
Finally, we employ a version of the beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995). Each subject
selects a half-integer between 0 and 10. The subject who selects the number closest to 2=3 of
the average in the session receives $30.
2.2 Memorization task
Before play in every game, the subjects are given up to 15 seconds to commit a number to
memory. The subjects are told that the number is to be retained during the play of the game,
and after the game, the subject would be asked for the number. These numbers are always
composed of a string of either 0 or 1, where the rst digit is always a 1. In the high load
treatment, we require the memorization of a 9 digit string, for example: 101110001. In the
low load treatment, we require the memorization of a 3 digit string, for example: 110. We
employ a within-subject design whereby the subjects face an alternating load of high and low.
Half of the subjects are given the high load rst, and half are given the low load rst. A new
number is randomly given in each of the games. The subjects are not given feedback about
the results of the memorization task.
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2.3 Experimental timeline and details
Before the incentivized portion of the experiment, we provide four unincentivized tasks: two
practice memorization tasks and two simple addition tasks. First, the subjects are given two
unincentivized practice rounds with the memorization task, one with a large number and one
with a small number. Then, in order to illustrate the extent to which the loads can a¤ect
the ability to make basic computations, we provide a memorization number, then we direct
the subjects to sum two randomly selected integers between 11 and 40, then we ask for the
memorization number. The subjects perform this addition task under both a low and a high
cognitive load.
Subsequently, we provide the subjects with instructions on 3 3 games.11 We direct the
subjects to play the 3  3 games under a di¤erential cognitive load. Before each of these
games, we give the subjects the memorization number, then we present the game, then we ask
for the memorization number. The instructions state that, should the subject perform X of
the 10 memorization tasks correctly in the 3  3 games then the computer would randomly
select the maximum of either 0 or X   7 outcomes of the 3 3 games for payment.
Between each of the ten 33 games, the subjects are forced to take a 20 second rest. During
this rest period, the subjects are not able a¤ect the screen which reads, "Rest!!! Because a
new game will start soon." Also note that, across sessions, we randomize the order in which
the subjects are presented the 3 3 games.
After the 3  3 games, the subjects are directed to play the 1   10 game and the beauty
contest game, under the alternating cognitive load which continues from the previous stages.
The subjects are told that they would be paid the amount of the 1  10 game and the beauty
contest game only if the memorization task is performed correctly for both of these games.
Note that we do not load the subjects when they are reading the instructions for the 1   10
game and the beauty contest game.
After the beauty contest memorization task is completed, the subjects are directed to
indicate their gender, whether they are an economics major, whether they have taken a game
11These instructions are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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theory course, an optional estimate of their grade point average (GPA), and a rating of the
di¢ culty in recalling the large and the small memorization numbers. These di¢ culty ratings
are solicited on a scale of 1 ("Very Di¢ cult") to 7 ("Not Very Di¢ cult"). Subsequently, the
subjects are told their amount earned and they are paid in cash. The subjects earned an
average of $17:89.
2.4 Discussion of the experimental design
We now discuss our experimental design. First, despite that Du¤y and Smith (2013) nd that
their cognitive load manipulation a¤ects behavior, here we employ a di¤erent design. First,
we employ a within-subject design, rather than a between-subject design. This is notable
because research suggests that the e¤ects of the cognitive load manipulation can be lasting
(Dewitte et al., 2005). In order to mitigate the e¤ects of the load of previous rounds, we
employ a mandatory rest-period between games. Second, unlike Du¤y and Smith (2013),
which employs a memorization number composed of digits ranging from 0 to 9, we restrict
attention to numbers composed exclusively of either 0 or 1. This design avoids the possibility
that the memorization task interacts with the payo¤ numbers in the games.
While we could observe that subjects were not able to employ any obvious memorization
aids (cell phones, writing the number on paper, etc.) we cannot say with certainty that no
subject used a memorization aid. For instance, with an appropriate positioning of the free
body parts (feet, legs, elbows, wrists, and ngers on left hand) one could possibly devise a
code to aid memorization. In our view, this possibility is not as advantageous as it rst
appears. This is because the subject must remember the code, and this will occupy cognitive
resources. So, while this remains a possibility, we do not regard it to be a serious problem.
Additionally, we design the experiment so that the responses to the games are as simple
as possible. For instance, in the 3  3 games we elicit the point beliefs of the action of the
opponent rather than more sophisticated measures of beliefs. This procedure can have a
drawback in that our measures of beliefs are somewhat coarse. On the other hand, the task
is su¢ ciently simple so that the memorization task is not likely to a¤ect the ability to comply
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with the elicitation procedure. Additionally, we elicit responses to the beauty contest, which
are the 21 half-integers between 0 and 10 rather than, as is more standard, the integers or real
numbers between 0 and 100. More generally, we design the experiment so that every response
in the games takes a di¤erent format than that required for the memorization task. In the
3  3 games, the 1   10 game, and the beauty contest game, the responses involve clicking
on the corresponding button, whereas the memorization task requires entering a sequence of
digits.
We employ a simplied version of the 3  3 games originally used by Costa-Gomes and
Weizsacker (2008), Rey-Biel (2008), and Bayer and Renou (2012). The original games have
integer payo¤s which range from 10 to 98. We employ a simplied version where payo¤s are
integers which range from 1 to 11. This would seem to reduce the computational di¢ culty in
deciding on an action.
We now discuss the equilibrium details of the games. The 3 3 games each have a single
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. The 1  10 game does not have a pure strategy equilibrium,
but has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In equilibrium, the player selects 10 with
probability 0:1, 9 with probability 0:2, 8 with probability 0:3, and 7 with probability 0:4. The
beauty contest game has a unique Nash Equilibrium where every player selects 0. Although
the 1  10 game has a mixed strategy equilibrium, the beauty contest is a more complicated
game. First, there are several opponents in the beauty contest game, whereas there is only a
single opponent in the 1  10 game. Second, the best response in the 1  10 game is obvious:
select one fewer than your opponent. This is in contrast to the beauty contest where the best
response is less straightforward. Finally, there are many decision rules in the beauty contest:
the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium or successive elimination of dominated strategies. By
contrast, in the 1   10 game there is only a single decision rule: select one fewer than your
opponent. This is because the game possesses neither a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium nor
a dominated strategy.
Finally, we note that we do not load the subjects during the instructions of the 1 10 game
and the beauty contest game because this could reduce the comprehension of the instructions.12
12We acknowledge that this design leaves open the possibility that the subject could decide on an action
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3 Results
3.1 A preliminary look at the cognitive load e¤ects
The subjects report a signicant di¤erence in the di¢ culty in recalling the large number
(M = 5:86, SD = 1:28) and the small number (M = 6:83, SD = 0:57) according to a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, W = 2142, p < 0:001. There are also signicant di¤erences
between the treatments in the length of time which they spend committing the number to
memory. Recall that the subjects are given up to 15 seconds in order to commit the number
to memory. The low load subjects have signicantly more of the 15 seconds remaining
(M = 12:58, SD = 3:08) than the high load subjects (M = 4:71, SD = 4:30), according to a
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test Z = 33:55, p < 0:001. The subjects are each given
12 incentivized memorization tasks, 6 as high load and 6 as low load. Subjects in the low
load are correct in 98:88% (972 of 984) of the attempts and the subjects in the high load are
correct in 97:05% (955 of 984) of the attempts.13
Despite these di¤erences between the treatments, we do not nd evidence that the subjects
in the high load treatment are unusually impaired. Recall that we pose 2 simple, unincen-
tivized arithmetic questions to each subject, one under a high load and one under a low load.
Given 328 arithmetic questions, only 10 incorrect responses are given, 6 under the high load
and 4 under the low load. Thus, we do not nd evidence that the high load signicantly
impairs the subjects.
3.2 The 1  10 game
Recall that the 1   10 game is relatively simple and provides a straightforward measure of
strategic sophistication. It would seem natural that the least sophisticated subject (L0) would
select 10. The subject who best responds to the L0 subjects (L1) would select 9. The subject
who best responds to L1 subjects (L2) would select 8, and so on. As such, the response is
negatively associated with the strategic sophistication of the subject.
during the instruction stage, thereby reducing the e¢ cacy of the cognitive load.
13According to a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, these are signicantly di¤erent, Z = 2:87, p =
0:004.
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As the response in the 1 10 game is bounded above at 10 and below at 1, we perform tobit
regressions with the 1   10 game choice as the dependent variable, subject to these bounds.
We include a dummy variable indicating whether the 1 10 game is played under a high load.
This variable obtains a value of 1 if the subject is under a high load and a 0 otherwise. In
addition to the high load dummy, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether the
subject has taken a game theory class, whether the subject reports being an economics major,
whether the subject is female, and their self-reported GPA. Recall that GPA is optional and
only 112 of 164 subjects provide a response. We summarize this analysis in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Tobit regressions with choice in the 1  10 game
(1) (2) (3)
High load  0:613  0:631  0:526
(0:286) (0:286) (0:308)
Economics major    0:499  0:667
(0:389) (0:444)
Game theory    0:836  0:727
(0:628) (0:704)
Female    0:278 0:143
(0:291) (0:311)
Self-reported GPA     0:210
(0:391)
Observations 164 164 112
-2 Log Likelihood 603:08 597:84 383:06
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 1. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1 and  indicates signi-
cance at p < 0:05.
Our analysis nds evidence that the subjects under a high load give a signicantly lower
response in the 1 10 game. To the extent that smaller responses are associated with a greater
strategic sophistication, this provides evidence that high load subjects are more strategic in
the 1  10 game than low load subjects.
3.3 The beauty contest game
We note that lower responses in the beauty contest are associated with greater strategic
sophistication. Recall that choice in the beauty contest is bounded above by 10 and below
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by 0. Therefore, we run tobit regressions with choice in the beauty contest as the dependent
variable, subject to these bounds. The analysis is otherwise equivalent to that summarized
in Table 1. We summarize this analysis in Table 2.
Table 2 Tobit regressions with choice in the beauty
contest game
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:677 0:647 0:941
(0:394) (0:397) (0:434)
Economics major    0:138  0:379
(0:549) (0:634)
Game theory    0:189 0:460
(0:888) (1:007)
Female   0:634 0:397
(0:404) (0:438)
Self-reported GPA      2:079
(0:550)
Observations 164 164 112
-2 Log Likelihood 742:82 739:78 489:32
The tobit regressions are performed with an upper bound of 10 and a lower
bound of 0. Note that  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance
at p < 0:05, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:01.
The high load dummy is positive and signicant at 0:1 in regression (1), and at 0:05 in
regression (3). This suggests that subjects under the high load are less strategic than subjects
under a low load. We also note that the self-reported GPA is negatively related to choice
in the beauty contest. This suggests that higher GPA subjects act more strategically in the
beauty contest.
Thus far, we nd that high load subjects are more strategic in the 1   10 game and less
strategic in the beauty contest. This behavior is consistent with two e¤ects of the cognitive
load. First, the computational ability of high load subjects is constrained. Second, the
high load subjects are aware that their computational ability is constrained, and they regard
their opponent as more sophisticated. These e¤ects have di¤erent implications in a relatively
uncomplicated game (1 10 game) and a relatively complicated game (beauty contest game).14
14 In support of our contention that the beauty contest is more complicated than the 1  10 game, we note
that GPA is related to choice in the beauty contest but not in the 1  10 game.
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In the uncomplicated game, where computational ability is not a binding constraint, the second
e¤ect dominates. In a complicated game, where computational ability is possibly a binding
constraint, the rst e¤ect dominates.
We note that there is an alternate explanation for our results involving the 1 10 game and
the beauty contest game. Recall that the load alternates across these games. For instance,
low (high) load subjects in the 1  10 game are high (low) load subjects in the beauty contest
game. It is possible that these results are due to unchanging, subject-specic traits, rather
than the result of the load. However, we note that there is not a signicant relationship
between any of the observable variables and the load treatment in these two games.15
3.4 The 3 3 games
We rst examine the relationship between cognitive load and a measure of the sophistication
of the beliefs of the subjects. One measure of the sophistication of the beliefs of the subject is
whether the subjects reports beliefs which are consistent with the Nash Equilibrium action of
the opponent. In the analysis which follows, the dependent variable, Nash beliefs, obtains a
value of 1 if the subjects states beliefs which are consistent with the Nash Equilibrium action,
and a 0 otherwise.
Since the 3  3 games vary in their complexity, we include this feature in the analysis.
We include an independent variable which lists the number of the subjects own dominated
strategies. This variable ranges from 0 to 2. We also include an independent variable which
lists the number of dominated strategies of the opponent. This variable also ranges from
0 to 2. As in the previous analysis, we account for the load by employing the high load
dummy variable. Additionally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the subject
has taken a game theory course, whether the subject reports being an economics major, and
whether the subject is female. In the analysis below, we refer to this collection of variables
as Demographics. Finally, we account for self-reported GPA.
Since we have 10 observations from each subject, we employ a repeated measures analy-
sis. We estimate an unstructured covariance matrix, clustered by subject. In other words,
15These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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we assume a unique correlation between any two observations involving a particular subject.
However, we assume that observations involving two di¤erent subjects are statistically inde-
pendent. Moreover, since the subjects each play 10 games, and there are two players per
game, there are 20 di¤erent roles: 10 for row players and 10 for column players. Therefore,
we estimate two such covariance matrices, one for row players and one for column players.
The regressions are estimated using maximum likelihood. We summarize this analysis in
Table 3.
Table 3 Repeated measures regressions of Nash beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:0807 0:0777 0:0439
(0:0365) (0:0367) (0:0420)
Own dominated strategies 0:0652 0:0646 0:0258
(0:0149) (0:0149) (0:0167)
Other dominated strategies 0:239 0:239 0:272
(0:0152) (0:0151) (0:0176)
High load-Own DS interaction  0:0542  0:0526  0:0381
(0:0213) (0:0213) (0:0231)
High load-Other DS interaction 0:0226 0:0232 0:0217
(0:0205) (0:0204) (0:0235)
GPA     0:0829
(0:0307)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 1640 1640 1120
-2 Log Likelihood 1714:1 1720:8 1120:1
2 Likelihood Ratio 365:50 366:44 328:07
The repeated measures regressions estimate an unstructured covariance matrix
for row players and an unstructured covariance matrix for column players, clus-
tered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercept, the individual
demographics variables, or the covariance matrices. Regressions (1) and (2) have
1640 observations (164 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has 1120 obser-
vations (112 subjects in 10 periods). Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1, 
at p < 0:05, and  at p < 0:01.
Regressions (1) and (2) show evidence of a positive relationship between cognitive load and
strategic sophistication, as measured by Nash beliefs. This suggests that high load subjects
express beliefs that their opponents are more sophisticated than do the low load subjects.
Although this is not robust to the specication which accounts for the self-reported GPA, we
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note we found a similar e¤ect in the 1   10 game. There we found that high load subjects
behave in a way which is consistent with more sophisticated beliefs.
We also note that the beliefs of high load subjects are less sensitive to the specication
of the game. However, we note that this is not robust to the specication involving the
self-reported GPA.
Next we explore the relationship between cognitive load and a commonly used measure of
strategic sophistication. In the strategic sophistication literature, L1 subjects are dened to
be those best responding to opponents who are the least sophisticated (L0) types. Typically
in matrix games, the L0 types are assumed to select each available action with an equal proba-
bility. In our setting, this would imply that the opponent selects each action with probability
1
3 . Needless to say, L1 subjects exhibit a relatively low level of strategic sophistication. In
the analysis below, the dependent variable, L1 classication, obtains a value of 1 if the subject
selects an action consistent with L1 behavior and a 0 otherwise. The analysis closely follows
that summarized in Table 3, with the exception that we include two additional independent
variables. We include an interaction between the number of the own dominated strategies
and number of the dominated strategies of the opponent. We also include the interaction
between this interaction variable and the high load dummy. This analysis is summarized in
Table 4.
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Table 4 Repeated measures regressions of L1 classication
(1) (2) (3)
High load 0:142 0:142 0:136
(0:0464) (0:0465) (0:0538)
Own dominated strategies 0:146 0:146 0:174
(0:0223) (0:0223) (0:0263)
Other dominated strategies  0:0280  0:0286  0:0388
(0:0262) (0:0262) (0:0311)
High load-Own DS interaction  0:0851  0:0859  0:108
(0:0349) (0:0349) (0:0401)
High load-Other DS interaction  0:107  0:106  0:0842
(0:0386) (0:0388) (0:0454)
GPA     0:128
(0:0425)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 1640 1640 1120
-2 Log Likelihood 1903:0 1914:4 1253:3
2 Likelihood Ratio 321:22 319:06 268:03
The repeated measures regressions estimate an unstructured covariance matrix
for row players and an unstructured covariance matrix for column players, clus-
tered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercept, the individual
demographics variables, the covariance matrices, the interaction between the num-
ber of own and the number of other dominated strategies, and the interaction with
this variable and the high load dummy. Regressions (1) and (2) have 1640 obser-
vations (164 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has 1120 observations (112
subjects in 10 periods). Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05,
and  at p < 0:01.
We rst note that the subjects under a high load are more likely than low load subjects
to be classied as L1. This suggests that subjects under a high load exhibit less strategic
sophistication than subjects under a low load. We also note that the two interaction terms
are signicant and negative. In particular, this suggests that the strategic sophistication of
high load subjects is less sensitive to the number of their own dominated strategies. Addi-
tionally, the strategic sophistication of high load subjects is more sensitive to the number of
the dominated strategies of their opponent.
Finally, we note that the GPA coe¢ cient is signicant and positive. This suggests that
higher GPA people are more likely to behave as an L1 type. Perhaps we nd this result because
the L1 classication has an adjacent, less sophisticated classication (L0) and an adjacent,
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more sophisticated classication (L2). Therefore, whereas we consider the L1 classication
to be relatively unsophisticated, perhaps low GPA subjects are not su¢ ciently sophisticated
to even be considered L1.
We now investigate the relationship between the accuracy of the stated beliefs and the
cognitive load. In particular, we now compare the stated beliefs with the distribution of
actions in the game. Note that 82 players are given the role of column players and 82 are
given the role of row players. We calculate the distribution of play of both of these treatments
for each game. Within the 82 players in each role, 48 make their decision under one cognitive
load treatment and 34 make their decision under the other. The calculation of the distribution
of the play accounts for this imbalance by equally weighting both cognitive load treatments.
In this analysis, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the subject indicates beliefs
identical to the most common action played by the 82 subjects in the opposite role for that
particular game. The analysis is otherwise equivalent to that summarized in Table 4. We
summarize this analysis in Table 5.
Table 5 Repeated measures regressions of correct beliefs of
distribution of actions
(1) (2) (3)
High load  0:109  0:109  0:104
(0:0440) (0:0440) (0:0486)
Own dominated strategies  0:116  0:117  0:118
(0:0269) (0:0269) (0:0284)
Other dominated strategies 0:112 0:112 0:135
(0:0219) (0:0219) (0:0226)
High load-Own DS interaction 0:0501 0:0507 0:0659
(0:0396) (0:0395) (0:0435)
High load-Other DS interaction 0:0851 0:0855 0:0855
(0:0307) (0:0306) (0:0307)
GPA     0:104
(0:0302)
Demographics No Y es Y es
Observations 1640 1640 1120
-2 Log Likelihood 1798:9 1803:3 1144:8
2 Likelihood Ratio 346:94 349:84 329:70
The repeated measures regressions estimate an unstructured covariance matrix
for row players and an unstructured covariance matrix for column players, clus-
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tered by subject. We do not provide the estimates of the intercept, the individual
demographics variables, the covariance matrices, the interaction between the num-
ber of own and the number of other dominated strategies, and the interaction with
this variable and the high load dummy. Regressions (1) and (2) have 1640 obser-
vations (164 subjects in 10 periods) and regression (3) has 1120 observations (112
subjects in 10 periods). Finally,  denotes signicance at p < 0:1,  at p < 0:05,
and  at p < 0:01.
First, we nd evidence that subjects under a high load have less accurate beliefs than
the low load subjects. Specically, in each regression we nd that the high load coe¢ cient
is negative and signicant at 0:05. We also nd that the interaction between the high load
dummy and the number of other dominated strategies is positive and signicant. This suggests
that the accuracy of the beliefs of high load subjects is more sensitive than the beliefs of low
load subjects to the number of dominated strategies of the other player.
4 Conclusion
We have described an experiment where subjects play a sequence of games designed to measure
their strategic sophistication while under a di¤erential cognitive load. These games include
ten 33 games, the 1 10 game, and the beauty contest game. Through our single cognitive
load manipulation we observe a nuanced relationship between available cognitive resources and
strategic sophistication. This behavior is consistent with two e¤ects. First, subjects under a
high cognitive load have di¢ culty in making the computations associated with optimal play.
Second, subjects under a high load are aware that they are relatively disadvantaged in the
cognitive ability distribution of the subjects. The net result of these e¤ects depends on the
strategic setting.
We see the rst e¤ect dominating the second e¤ect when, in the relatively complicated
beauty contest game, the high load subjects play less strategically. This behavior is consistent
with the diminished ability of subjects to compute the optimal strategy in this complicated
setting. We additionally see this e¤ect dominating in that high load subjects have a greater
di¢ culty in predicting the actions of their opponents and they are more likely to behave as
the relatively unsophisticated L1 type. Finally, we see this in that the subjects in the 3 3
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games are less sensitive to the complexity of the game, as measured by the number of their
own dominated strategies.
On the other hand, we see the second e¤ect dominating the rst e¤ect when, in the
relatively uncomplicated 1  10 game, the subjects select a more strategic response, expecting
to be paired with a more cognitively able subject. We also see this e¤ect in that high load
subjects are more likely to express beliefs which are consistent with their opponents playing
the Nash Equilibrium strategy. Finally, we see this e¤ect dominating in that the subjects in
the 3 3 games are more sensitive to the complexity of the game, as measured by the number
of the dominated strategies of their opponent.
We hope that this research is helpful in suggesting improvements in existing models of
strategic sophistication. Our evidence suggests that constraints on cognitive resources can
a¤ect the computations involving optimal behavior but also the perception of the subjects
relative standing in the distribution of cognitive resources. Our research corroborates previous
research that these two e¤ects are important in the study of games. In particular, our results
suggest that a lower measure of cognitive ability will not necessarily produce less sophisticated
behavior, particularly when the ability to make the necessary computations is not a binding
constraint.
We also hope that this research will encourage the use of the cognitive load manipulation
in any setting in which cognition plays a crucial role in behavior. Perhaps the most obvious
application of cognitive load is in the rational inattention literature.16 Rational inattention
models assume that decision makers are unable to process all available information. However,
decision makers optimally allocate their limited attention. It would seem protable to inves-
tigate these models in the laboratory, by manipulating the limits of attention via cognitive
load.
We acknowledge that there is much work to be done on this topic. For instance, we were
not able to observe the order in which the subjects provided their action and their beliefs in
the 3  3 games. In the future, it could be protable to observe if there is a relationship
16See Sims (2003), Reis (2006), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), Wiederholt (2010), Dahremöller and Fels
(2012), and Persson (2012). See Cheremukhin, Popova, and Tutino (2012) for an experiment involving rational
inattention.
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between the cognitive load manipulation and the order of the selection of actions and beliefs.
We also hope to learn whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect of not soliciting beliefs. Perhaps the
solicitation of beliefs prompts the high load subjects to be aware of the strategic considerations,
where that would possibly not occur if beliefs were not solicited. Finally, we are interested
to learn the implications of a more di¢ cult high load (more than 9 binary digits) and a less
di¢ cult low load (less than 3 binary digits).
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Appendix
In the games below, 10 points are equivalent to $3:50. Games 1A and Game 1B: both players
have 2 dominated strategies. The game is adapted from Game 1 of Bayer and Renou (2012).
Game 1A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 4 5; 7 3; 6
Middle 6; 8 4; 9 1; 2
Bottom 7; 1 2; 5 2; 4
Game 1B
Left Center Right
Top 2; 8 3; 1 8; 7
Middle 6; 6 4; 3 9; 5
Bottom 5; 4 1; 1 7; 3
Games 2A and 2B: one player has a dominated strategy and the other player has two.
The game is adapted from Game 3 of Bayer and Renou (2012).
Game 2A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 8 3; 5 1; 9
Middle 9; 2 5; 3 6; 4
Bottom 4; 1 7; 6 2; 8
Game 2B
Left Center Right
Top 4; 5 6; 3 7; 7
Middle 3; 9 9; 8 2; 4
Bottom 5; 6 10; 1 9; 2
Games 3A and 3B: one player has two dominated strategies, the other player does not
have any dominated strategies. The game is adapted from Game VS1R of Rey-Biel (2008).
Game 3A
Left Center Right
Top 1; 9 2; 6 4; 3
Middle 4; 4 5; 4 5; 4
Bottom 7; 3 7; 5 6; 8
Game 3B
Left Center Right
Top 10; 2 2; 10 7; 11
Middle 7; 3 6; 4 7; 10
Bottom 6; 6 1; 7 9; 8
Games 4A and 4B: one player has one dominated strategy, other player does not have a
dominated strategy. The game, adapted from Game VS2R of Rey-Biel (2008), is dominance
solvable.
Game 4A
Left Center Right
Top 6; 6 4; 8 4; 9
Middle 4; 8 11; 3 3; 5
Bottom 1; 10 10; 6 3; 8
Game 4B
Left Center Right
Top 11; 1 1; 8 7; 5
Middle 4; 8 4; 8 1; 11
Bottom 6; 5 5; 7 2; 5
Games 5A and 5B: neither player has a dominated strategy. The game is adapted from
Game VSNDR of Rey-Biel (2008).
Game 5A
Left Center Right
Top 8; 6 2; 6 1; 11
Middle 4; 6 7; 6 3; 6
Bottom 2; 7 2; 5 4; 4
Game 5B
Left Center Right
Top 3; 10 5; 5 3; 9
Middle 4; 9 2; 9 4; 9
Bottom 9; 5 3; 8 2; 7
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The screen during the game decision:
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